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A B S T R A C T
Although addiction neuroscience hopes to uncover the neural basis of addiction and deliver a wide range of
novel neuro-interventions to improve the treatment of addiction, the translation of addiction neuroscience to
practice has been widely viewed as a ‘bench to bedside’ failure. Importantly, though, this linear ‘bench to
bedside’ conceptualisation of knowledge translation has not been attentive to the role addiction treatment
providers play in reproducing, translating, or resisting neuroscientific knowledge. This study explores how, to
what extent, and for what purpose addiction treatment providers deploy neuroscientific representations and
discuss the brain in practice. It draws upon interviews with 20 Australian treatment providers, ranging from
addiction psychiatrists in clinics to case-workers in therapeutic communities. Our findings elucidate how dif-
ferent treatment providers: (1) invoke the authority and make use of neuroscience in practice (2) make reference
to neuroscientific concepts (e.g., neuroplasticity); and sometimes represent the brain using vivid neurobiological
language, metaphors, and stories; and, (3) question the therapeutic benefits of discussing neuroscience and the
use of neuroimages with clients. We argue that neurological ontologies of addiction, whilst shown to be selec-
tively and strategically invoked in certain circumstances, may also at times be positioned as lacking centrality
and salience within clinical work. In doing so, we render problematic any straightforward assumption about the
universal import of neuroscience to practice that underpins narratives of ‘bench to bedside’ translation.
1. Introduction
Despite substantial global investment in neuroscience research, in-
cluding the Human Brain Project (Human Brain Project, 2017) in Europe
and The US BRAIN Initiative (US National Institutes of Health, 2019), the
translation into clinical practice of addiction neuroscience research
continues to face challenges. There is a widely acknowledged “bench to
bedside gap” (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2016, p. 5) that
characterises the difficulties research programs internationally have
faced when attempting to translate research on the brain into clinical
treatments. Efforts to bridge this gap have recently been revitalised. For
example, the newly formed Neuroscience Interest Group within the In-
ternational Society of Addiction Medicine, including among others, Aus-
tralian, UK and US neuroscience researchers, published a consensus
statement and ‘roadmap’ to better integrate neuroscience-informed
interventions into addiction treatment (Verdejo-García et al., 2019).
Moreover, efforts to overcome these difficulties have increasingly fo-
cussed on ‘rapid translation’ (Ostergren et al., 2014) to ‘unlock’ the
clinical potential of neuroscience by accelerating the development of
novel therapeutics (e.g., pharmacotherapies, gene therapies, gamified
cognitive training) to treat drug addiction.
However, the framing of translation as a ‘bench to bedside’ process
is oversimplified in its linear conceptualisation of knowledge transfer
(Martin et al., 2008) and does not consider how treatment providers
interact with, resist or reproduce addiction neuroscientific knowledge
in clinical encounters and practices. In attending to the complexity of
the translation of addiction neuroscience and its effects, our study is
situated within a wider body of science and technology studies (STS)
scholarship that explores how the emergence of addiction phenomena
is unstable and context specific. By examining how treatment providers'
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practices contribute to the enactment of addiction in different ways, our
work adds to previous STS efforts that have explored how addiction
problems are enacted in, for example, policy (Fraser, 2016), law (Seear,
2019), youth drug education (Farrugia and Fraser, 2017) and online
counselling (Savic et al., 2018).
The ‘bench to bedside gap’ metaphor tends to focus on the failure to
deliver novel biotechnologies, including treatments (e.g., pharma-
cotherapies) and tools (e.g., advanced neuroimaging), to clinical prac-
tice. Often, however, little attention is paid to contemporary social ef-
fects of translating neuroscience into clinical interventions and policies,
and the implications of framing addiction in neuroscientific terms.
Given the critical role that treatment providers play in clinical trans-
lation and the potential impact of treatment providers' representations
of the brain, their role in communicating and translating neuroscience
on the front line of addiction treatment remains under-researched.
This study addresses this limitation by examining whether – and, if
so, how – addiction treatment providers discuss neuroscience with cli-
ents and employ neuroscientific models in clinical practice. Through
interviews with treatment providers working in a range of different
professions in Victoria, Australia, we shed light on why neuroscience is
at times discussed, but on other occasions avoided, and also how dif-
ferent methods are employed when discussing the brain (including
through narrative accounts or analogy). Our findings elucidate the pi-
votal role that treatment providers play, and the varying techniques
they adopt, when translating neuroscience to practice. In doing so, we
complicate a simple ‘bench to bedside’ translational pathway by at-
tending to treatment providers' roles in influencing translation, and also
contribute to an ongoing debate (e.g., Fraser et al., 2014; Hall et al.,
2015) about the relevance of the neurobiological within contemporary
addiction treatment settings.
2. Neuroscience, personhood and discussing the brain in practice
There is a growing body of scholarship tracing the links between
neuroscience and personhood, in particular examining how individuals
draw upon neuroscientific concepts to understand themselves and
others. The constitution of individuals as ‘cerebral subjects’ (Vidal,
2009) has been the focus of recent work that explores an increasing
“neurologisation of the person” (Singh, 2013, p. 813). Although run-
ning the risk of becoming an overdetermined sociological term
(Pickersgill et al., 2011), the employment of the verb ‘to neurologise’
and the process of ‘neurologisation’ has facilitated a conceptual critique
exploring how different actors (e.g., patients, clinicians, scientists) de-
ploy neuroscientific terms and frameworks to apportion responsibility
and construct and position themselves and others in varying ways
(Buchbinder, 2015; Pickersgill et al., 2011; Singh, 2013).
In constructing ‘cerebral subjects’, the compelling nature and
rhetorical function of brain images has received considerable attention
(Choudhury and Slaby, 2016; Dumit, 2004; Rose and Abi-Rached,
2013). Through primary and secondary sources, Rose and Abi-Rached
(2013) traced the development of different brain visualisation techni-
ques from the early nineteenth century through to the present day.
They cast light upon how neuroimaging techniques, via the visualisa-
tion of often unforeseen neural structures or phenomena, have served to
bridge the gap between the theoretical and observable in clinical
medicine, and allowed for the proliferation of a wide range of neuro-
biological explanations. Such visualisations are epitomised by the Glass
Brain (Neuroscape, 2016): a ‘state-of-the-art’ 3D brain visualisation
technology that combines magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and
electroencephalogram (EEG) to display real-time brain activity and
connectivity between regions. Earlier critiques have been made about
the highly aestheticized construction of contemporary neuroimages
(e.g., fMRI images) that are often incorrectly presented as direct pic-
tures of brain activity which constitute, for example, ‘madness’ as re-
siding within the brain or mental illness caused by a damaged region of
the brain (Dumit, 1999).
Within critical addiction scholarship, it has been argued that neu-
roimages, as part of a wider dominant neurobiological discourse, per-
form the function of characterising addiction as a disease of the brain
(Fraser et al., 2014). The brain disease model of addiction (BDMA) that
represents addiction as a chronic, relapsing brain disease (Leshner,
1997; Volkow et al., 2016) has received strong support among policy-
makers and neuroscientists, particularly in the US. Researchers from the
US National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) argue that chronic drug use
‘hijacks’ the brain's reward systems, making it difficult for people to
stop using drugs and resulting in high rates of relapse (Dackis and
O'Brien, 2005). There is an ongoing debate, however, about whether
the BDMA is supported by neuroscientific evidence (Hall et al., 2017),
and whether it has delivered on its promises to benefit treatment and
reduce stigma for people with addiction (Fraser et al., 2017; Hall et al.,
2015; Heather et al., 2018; Lewis, 2015). Although there has been re-
search on treatment providers' views about disease models of addiction
and their clinical impact (for a review, see: Barnett et al., 2017), little
research has been conducted on how treatment providers discuss the
brain more generally in practice, including whether they employ ter-
minology familiar to the brain disease paradigm. Our paper addresses
this gap in the literature.
Of particular relevance to our own study is Buchbinder's (2015)
examination of the social implications of neuroscientific thinking and
the creative uptake of neurobiological discourses by clinicians working
in a US paediatric pain clinic. Buchbinder's ethnographic inquiry illu-
strated how, through discussing and rhetorically mapping the brain
with patients as a therapeutic tool, physicians engaged in a distinctive
form of neuroscientific representation: neural imagining. Buchbinder
posited that neural imagining within the pain clinic relied on a dis-
tinctive clinical epistemology that privileged creative imaginaries over
visualisation techniques (e.g., fMRI), which notably were often absent
or technically impossible, to reveal truths about the body. Aided by the
use of an ‘imaginary toolkit’ consisting of vivid neurobiological lan-
guage, images, and metaphors, neural imagining was employed by
clinicians to: reduce stigma and legitimise pain symptoms; reaffirm
adolescent identities affected by chronic illness; and, to offer a glimpse
of a world in which intractable pain could not only be visualised, but
also cured. Neural imagining allowed for a metaphorical means to
spatially locate pain when visualisation and diagnostic technologies
could not. For example, hypnotherapy as an alternative therapy for pain
was ‘imagined’ in the context of ‘rewiring circuitry’ and ‘reprogram-
ming the pain map’. Thus, by foregrounding a picture of a highly plastic
brain, neural imagining offered a more hopeful alternative to dominant
popular and scientific representations that viewed the teenage brain
through a lens of pathology.
One question that is receiving increased attention within sociology,
STS, anthropology and beyond is the relevance, or indeed irrelevance, of
neuroscientific understandings of health and disease amongst a web of
other biological, psychological and social concerns encountered in ev-
eryday life. Empirical findings increasingly demonstrate that neu-
roscientific concepts rarely “cleanly eclipse” (Buchbinder, 2015, p. 13)
the person. Rather, neuroscientific concepts compete and integrate with
other forms of subjectivity (e.g., psychological, social), with sub-
jectivity being constituted via more than just the brain (Meurk et al.,
2016; Pickersgill et al., 2011). These empirical findings have high-
lighted the limitations of concepts such as the ‘neurochemical self’
(Rose, 2003), by disrupting over-theorised accounts that privilege
neuroscience and characterise the brain as constituting the “epicentre
of personhood” (Pickersgill et al., 2011, p. 362).
In this study we apply a critical lens to addiction clinical practice by
exploring the ways in which treatment providers discuss and represent
the brain. Specifically, our analysis aims to explore how, to what extent,
and for what purpose addiction treatment providers invoke neu-
roscientific representations or discuss the brain in practice. In exploring
these dimensions, we shed light on broader questions relevant to the
uptake of biomedicine that examine whether neuroscientific ways of
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understanding addiction have universal import in different settings.
Our analysis provides fresh insights into how treatment providers en-
gage with neuroscience in healthcare practice, and in doing so has
implications for: (1) the translation of addiction neuroscience via a
nuanced understanding of current ways treatment providers adopt and
deploy neuroscience; and, (2) organisations responsible for developing
engaging and relevant clinical resources (e.g., health promotion mate-
rials) that incorporate addiction neuroscience.
3. Methods
In this paper, we present data generated from 20 interviews con-
ducted in 2015–16 with treatment providers working in five drug and
alcohol treatment settings in Victoria, Australia (participant details are
summarised in Table 1). The interviews were conducted as part of a
wider mixed-methods project that explored addiction treatment provi-
ders’ views about a wide range of topics. These included how they
viewed alcohol and other drug problems and the aetiology of addiction,
what types of treatment models they used in practice, and how, if at all,
they drew upon (and ascribed relevance to) neuroscience in their
clinical practice. The project was granted ethics approval by the
Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (CF15/
2656–2015001096).
Potential recruitment sites were identified from the first author's
networks and the alcohol and other drug treatment services online
listing (https://www2.health.vic.gov.au/alcohol-and-drugs/aod-
treatment-services). Potential sites were purposively selected to re-
cruit a variety of different types of providers from settings with varying
treatment philosophies (e.g., harm reduction, abstinence), funding
models (including both public and private), and geographic locations
that spanned urban and rural areas in the state of Victoria. At the
outset, six sites provisionally agreed to participate in the research.
However, one site (a private service that charged clients fees) disen-
gaged from the project citing lack of available staff resources.
The five recruitment sites that participated in the study included
services based in inner and outer Melbourne that offered a range of
different interventions. Sites A, C and E (refer to Table 1) were me-
tropolitan Melbourne interdisciplinary clinics that offered services in-
cluding: assessment and referral, counselling, psychiatry and addiction
medicine, along with harm reduction interventions (e.g., pharma-
cotherapy, needle and syringe programs). In contrast, site B was a
therapeutic community based in a rural setting where residents lived on
site and participated in an abstinence-based recovery program. Site D
was a private psychology practice. All sites, except for site D, were:
linked to publicly-funded health services or non-government organisa-
tions; part of the wider Victorian public alcohol and other drug treat-
ment sector; and, were generally free in terms of cost. Site D was out-
side the Victorian public alcohol and other drug treatment sector and
clients were charged fees for service (of which many clients could apply
for a government rebate under mental health care public funding).
Once a site had provided local ethics approval for the research to
proceed, a primary contact at each site advertised the study to other
treatment providers following a “gatekeeper referral” method
(Jessiman, 2013). The study advertisement informed prospective par-
ticipants that their participation would involve an interview about their
views on alcohol and other drug addiction treatment, practice, neu-
roscience and the BDMA.
The 20 participants across the five sites included Addiction
Medicine Specialists, Psychiatrists, Nurses, Social Workers,
Psychologists, Counsellors and Case Workers, along with others
working in addiction treatment services. They comprised 10 men and
10 women, ranging in age from 32 to 66 years. Their length of em-
ployment at their current workplace ranged from less than one year to
14 years. Participants had worked within alcohol and other drug
treatment for between one year and 31 years. Demographic data was
unavailable for one participant.
The interview schedule was designed to explore participants' views
about a wide range of topics including the aetiology of alcohol and
other drug addiction, treatment models and the relevance of neu-
roscience to clinical practice. All interviews were conducted face-to-
face and on site at treatment providers’ places of employment. The
mean duration of interviews was 44 min, ranging from 18 to 69 min.
Interview transcripts were anonymised and analysed using NVivo,
Version 11. Data were coded by the first author (AB) following a two-
staged approach in line with the constant comparison method (Seale,
1999). During the first stage, as part of the wider project, transcripts
were read and preliminary codes were applied to emergent themes.
These themes related to participants’ views about: drug and alcohol
problems (e.g., aetiology, treatment); social and psychological models
and their relevance to treatment; and, (the focus of this current paper)
the relevance and clinical utility of the brain and neuroscientific models
for addiction clinical practice. A detailed coding structure was formed
from this initial coding stage. From this first stage, data (not used in the
current article) were presented in another paper that explored how
neuroscientific discourses problematised addiction (Barnett et al.,
2018).
Following on from the initial study, we also wanted to explore how
addiction treatment providers invoked neuroscientific representations
and whether they viewed discussing the brain as relevant to practice.
However, it was apparent that the first coding procedure had generated
a broad coding structure that was insufficiently granular to answer the
specific research questions asked in this article. Therefore, a second,
more detailed coding of participants’ references to the brain and views
about neuroscientific models was performed in order to reinterrogate
the initial coding framework to obtain a more detailed picture of why
and how treatment providers discussed the brain with clients. For our
discussion below, we draw out key themes that arose following this
two-staged analysis and provide illustrative quotes for each.
4. Findings
In what follows, we explore how different treatment providers: (1)
invoked the authority and made use of neuroscience in practice; (2)
represented the brain and engaged in neural imagining (Buchbinder,
2015); and, (3) questioned the therapeutic benefits of discussing neu-
robiology and the use of neuroimages with clients.
Table 1
Participants.
Recruitment site ID Role
Site A: Outer Melbourne
inter-disciplinary clinic
A1 Addiction Medicine Specialist
A2 Registered Nurse
A3 Counsellor Psychologist
A4 Primary Health Care and Needle and Syringe
Programme Worker
A5 Counsellor
A6 Enrolled Nurse
A7 Enrolled Nurse
A8 Enrolled Nurse
A9 Dual Diagnosis Clinician
A10 Nurse - assessment
Site B: Therapeutic
community
B1 Manager and Counsellor
B2 Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) Trainer
B3 Case Worker
B4 Case Manager
Site C: Inner Melbourne inter-
disciplinary clinic
C1 Addiction Psychiatrist
C2 Addiction Psychiatrist
C3 Addiction Psychiatry Registrar
C4 Addiction Medicine Specialist
Site D: Private psychology
practice
D1 Psychologist
Site E: Inner Melbourne clinic
linked to hospital
E1 Addiction Medicine Specialist
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4.1. Making use of neuroscience
The extent to which treatment providers discussed neuroscience
with clients varied. Some described how they often spoke about the
brain with clients, for example: “It's all very neurobiological the discus-
sion” (A1). Several participants explained how they invoked the au-
thority of neuroscience to explain what was happening for clients in
“scientific” terms. For instance, an Enrolled Nurse (A7) talked about
how she felt that talking with clients about addiction in neuroscientific
terms was beneficial to her practice because clients were “pleased that
they can explain what's happened to them, and it's science”. Similarly, an
Addiction Medicine Specialist (E1) explained how discussing the brain,
and deploying a neurobiological model as an explanatory tool, gave
clients insight into what was “actually” happening:
Absolutely I use that [neuroscience] all the time. I use, if you like, a
neurobiological model of addiction and behaviour to try and explain
things to people because I think it's really important that individuals
understand what's actually happening for them.
Many participants viewed discussing the brain as providing clients
with increased insight into their condition. For instance, in the context
of abstinence and possible anhedonia associated with cessation of me-
thamphetamine use, a Counsellor Psychologist (A3) believed that de-
ploying neuroscientific concepts could offer her clients an explanation
for their symptoms:
[…] with stimulants, amphetamines - you know, another hot topic
now, ‘ice’ - people find that if they've been using stimulants for a
long time that when they stop, what they - I guess their brain gets
used to such a high level of stimulation, but when one goes back to
normal it feels like depression. I'll say something like that. I'll discuss
that on that level with them. That's as far as I'll go with things of
neuroscience but that makes sense to me and makes sense to them.
A Dual Diagnosis Clinician (A9) with a social work background
believed that delivery of neuroscientific information by, or in the pre-
sence of, someone with neuroscientific training strengthened the
veracity of the information. Participant A9 gave an example of this in
the context of discussing synthetic cannabis and its effects on the brain:
[I talk about the brain] when talking about synthetic cannabis – the
perfect binding to the CB1 and CB2 receptors – not only binds way
more powerfully than marijuana but doesn't disintegrate. […] So we
do a lot of that stuff without trying to be brain experts […] I will say:
“listen you are listening to it from a social worker” – so it's a bit sort
of downplaying it […] sometimes we'll take along a psychiatrist to
be the scientist.
In these instances, neuroscientific knowledge and biomedical ex-
pertise were afforded epistemic authority over other ways that clients’
drug and alcohol problems might be understood, such as in terms of
social, cultural, or environmental factors.
Some participants strategically invoked research on the effects of
drugs on the brain as a deterrent to future use. For example, a Manager
and Counsellor (B1) working in a therapeutic community selectively
discussed the brain to associate alcohol use with damage to the brain:
“so we'll talk about your brain, brain function, those sort of things. We might
do it in conjunction with talking about alcohol in particular and the damage
that can come [from drinking]”. This example reflected how certain
treatment providers in our study recalled discussing the brain as an
entity, without necessarily offering clients more detailed neuroscientific
explanations (for example, by discussing ‘neuroplasticity’ as is men-
tioned in the next example).
In contrast to the use of neuroscience to describe the toxic and
damaging impact of drugs on the brain, other participants employed
neuroscience to reduce self-blame and generate optimism. For example,
when describing the utility of deploying neuroscientific models a
Psychologist (D1) said: “So I think the neurology is really helpful for people
to sort of start to begin to shed some of the shame around it [addiction]”.
Several treatment providers mentioned that they may explicitly discuss
the concept of ‘neuroplasticity’ and the brain's ability to change over
time with clients, in order to “use neuroscience in order to create that
hope” (B2; CBT Trainer) about recovery.
In sum, the epistemic authority of neuroscience was strategically
invoked in certain circumstances, in order to enjoin clients to embrace
particular models of addiction or to discourage further drug use. It was
also used to encourage both an empathetic relation with the self, and
optimism about recovery and capacity for change.
4.2. Representing the brain
The majority of respondents described how they deployed various
concepts (e.g., neuroplasticity, brain damage) with clients at different
times. Some providers, though, gave more detailed accounts of how
they discussed neuroscience with clients using vivid neurobiological
language, metaphors, and stories. Informed by Buchbinder's (2015)
notion of ‘neural imagining’, we discuss how metaphors were deployed
to communicate complex neuroscientific concepts and translate these
into accessible stories for clients. As we will show, neural imagining
took place within wider treatment contexts and was designed to con-
struct the problem of addiction, and the solution to it, in a specific way
for particular types of clients.
The first example comes from an interview with a Dual Diagnosis
Clinician (A9), who had experience of working in treatment delivery in
the USA and Australia. Explaining how he spoke about addiction when
teaching young people during a workshop, he stated:
[The metaphor] I'd use with kids was ‘Russian Roulette’ […] I had a
classroom full of kids and I'd say: “a certain percentage of you may
have a natural tolerance. Another proportion of you are going to
teach yourself to become attached to alcohol in an addictive way.”
[…] I probably mightn't have said “your brain is going to be hi-
jacked”, but, I'd use a very similar word which was - I'd use the word
‘hostage’. “So you're a hostage. Your brain will become a hostage.
You're not already but - you can do something about it - but you may
become a hostage.” […] It's a similar metaphor to hijacking - but it's
all metaphoric I think. But I like the word hijacking.
Though not employing the BDMA language of ‘hijacking’, this par-
ticipant described his use of a similar metaphor about the brain be-
coming a ‘hostage’ to addiction. This description emphasises the belief
in the difficulty of escape or recovery once addicted, while the Russian
Roulette metaphor framed drug use as an inherently risky process.
Buchbinder (2015) observed that neural imagining was employed in the
pain clinic to reduce stigma, legitimise symptoms, and to offer hope
that intractable pain could be cured. In contrast, by explaining addic-
tion in terms of ‘Russian Roulette’ and the potential for the brain to
become ‘hostage’ to drug use, neural imagining is used with a non-
clinical audience with the aim to discourage youth from using alcohol
and other drugs. Neural imagining in this instance provides a less
flexible and less hopeful image of the brain than that constructed
through the talk of Buchbinder's respondents.
In another example, an Addiction Medicine Specialist (E1) described
how they viewed addiction not as a disease, but rather as a “condi-
tioned response” or “a learned state”. This participant said that their
view of the aetiology of addiction was better matched to Marc Lewis’
(2015) neurodevelopment model, that characterises addiction as a
process of deep learning underpinned by reversible forms of neuro-
plasticity, rather than a disease of the brain. Consistent with this view,
participant E1 deployed metaphors that represented addiction as a
process of learning. Neural imagining in this example references a
neurodevelopmental model of addiction, comparing addiction to
learning an instrument:
That's just the way the brain works, I don't see it being separate from
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learning a behaviour. I use the illustration [with patients] if you
were learning a musical instrument, your brain is developing new
pathways and the better you get at it the more automatic that be-
haviour becomes. That's actually what's happening when people use
drugs, it's just the drugs are much more highly rewarding and so
those pathways are being developed much more rapidly.
In our final example, another Addiction Medicine Specialist (C4)
talked about using metaphors in the context of educating patients about
the effect of opioids on the brain and opioid replacement therapy. He
deployed a lock and key metaphor with certain patients, depending on
their health literacy, to explain the neuropharmacological effects of
drugs on the brain and pharmacotherapies such as opioid replacement
therapies:
I use a metaphor a lot with talking about opioid substitution: the
‘key in the lock’. [I explain to patients] – “when you take an opioid,
such as if you're going to use heroin, heroin is like an external key
that opens the lock. The body produces a whole lot of locks […] and
when you stop taking heroin, you've got all these locks sitting here,
and your body just stops making keys in the body factory. So, what
happens is the doors don't open and the locks are locked and you get
sick. [Replacement therapy] keeps you well and sober” […] cer-
tainly opioids are very suited to those sorts of metaphors.
However, the respondent further described how he avoided the ‘lock
and key’ metaphor and references to the brain or science when treating
patients who also worked in healthcare:
With an impaired physician […] you don't want to pitch at that
level, necessarily, because they'll start rolling their eyes. But then
again, you don't want it to descend into an academic, intellectual
discussion about addiction which a lot of doctors do […] you've got
to be really careful that they're a patient, and this isn't a discussion
about another patient. You wanted to bring it back to them. Their
knowledge, or the level of detail about the science of addiction isn't
really relevant. It's how they're feeling.
This example illustrates that for some patients, neural imagining
(here, a ‘lock and key’ metaphor) was accounted for as having ex-
planatory value insofar as translating complex pharmacological pro-
cesses into something more comprehensible for people without specific
expertise. For patients without a medical background, the use of the
‘lock and key’ metaphor framed (the solution to) addiction as residing
within the brain. However, for doctors and nurses in treatment, the
deployment of this metaphor was avoided for two reasons. First, it may
be perceived as an over-simplistic representation of addiction and the
brain. Second, it characterised addiction as being a biomedical problem
with a technical solution (e.g., pharmacotherapies). In doing so, it de-
personalised the problem of addiction for a patient population that may
require their subjectivity and emotions to be specifically attended to in
order to derive therapeutic gains. Thus, neural imagining was used
strategically, as part of a broader process of ‘selective neurologisation’
that we discuss next.
4.3. Selective neurologisation
Despite the invocation of neuroscientific notions by several re-
spondents, many treatment providers – as we have seen – recalled how
they refrained from deploying neuroscientific accounts with every
client. Although the central theme of the interviews was about how the
brain was discussed, some participants in the initial interviews refer-
enced how images may, or may not, aid discussions with their clients.
Therefore, we asked specific questions about treatment providers’ en-
gagements with visual representations of the brain in subsequent in-
terviews. In this section, we include reflections on the accounts of the
use, or non-use, of images within therapy.
An Addiction Psychiatry Registrar (C3) was one example of a
participant who did not fully embrace a neurobiological model in in-
teractions with clients: she said that she discussed the brain only
“Sometimes […] in fairly vague terms”. Likewise, a Manager and
Counsellor (B1) at another service stated that “we might have those
conversations […] it [the brain] might come up, but it might not”.
Decision-making about whether to introduce neurobiological con-
cepts and language within therapeutic discourse was, for most partici-
pants, guided by whether a neuroscientific account was perceived to
have clinical utility for a particular client. The following excerpt ex-
emplifies such selective neurologisation. When asked whether they
discussed the brain with clients, an Addiction Psychiatrist (C2) re-
sponded:
Yes, not always. So not 100 per cent. I usually pick the client, who,
first of all, might express an interest in it, then I always would […]
So I guess what I'm saying is I tend to discuss it [neuroscience] only
when I think it's helpful for whatever reason. It isn't always kind of
an essential part of how I discuss diagnoses.
However, in the majority of cases, respondents spoke about how
they “usually [don't] go into that sort of depth [i.e. talking about neuro-
plasticity]” (A2; Registered nurse), since “you just have to keep it simple
for the patients” (C1; Addiction Psychiatrist). Participant C1 also ques-
tioned the clinical utility of showing a client an image or model of their
own or another person's brain:
I don't have a model of the brain on my desk. I know some GPs do.
But even then, I'm not sure how helpful it would be. Well, some
people, it might scare them. If they've had a brain scan, a CT or MRI
of their brain, and it shows shrinkage, for some people that may
register impact. [For others] it may be a bit late [to be helpful], if
you see that, actually.
Another Addiction Psychiatrist (C2) reflected on how she might use
a diagram with clients that presented the relationship between different
emotions and behaviours; however, the diagram did not present a vi-
sualisation of the brain per se.
Of course, participants’ clients may have been exposed to visual
representations of the brain during their treatment via other avenues;
for example, through leaflets given to clients, on websites of the ser-
vices, or where clients themselves may have researched addiction
neuroscience on the internet. It is worth noting, though, that when
referring to their clinical interactions with clients, participants in our
study generally described visual representations of the brain as having
only limited (or no) capacity for enjoining their clients to consider their
addiction in neurobiological terms, with a view to advancing therapy.
The main factor influencing perceptions of clinical utility - and,
hence, if and how the brain was introduced by treatment providers -
was whether neuroscientific concepts were judged to align with clients’
own perspectives on (their) addiction. For example, one respondent
(A8; Enrolled Nurse) noted that neuroscience was discussed only when
perceived to be desired by the client:
You really have to choose the level that you deliver the information -
yeah. Some people want it and some people don't, so it's - yeah,
definitely, you're not going to discuss that [neuroscience] with every
client.
Another provider (A3; Counsellor Psychologist) stated that they
would not discuss addiction in neurobiological terms with clients “un-
less they were ‘into it’ […] usually it's not brain stuff they come up with.
Yeah, so I match whatever language they use”. In a similar vein, this
participant also described how visual representations of the brain were
mainly relevant for the education of treatment providers, but not ne-
cessarily clients:
We might not show them pictures of MRIs and things that we might
have seen and looked at in our PDs [personal development sessions]
and discussed, but we will convey that information to clients if that
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makes sense in some way.
She went onto describe how MRI images with localised areas re-
presenting changes in specific brain regions were not helpful for clients
in practice:
We're not going to tell the clients: […] “this one thing in your brain
here lights up [pointing to an imaginary picture], that's why you
have this addiction.” That's not helpful to anybody.
For some participants, discussions of the brain were avoided, as
neuroscientific concepts were not seen to align with, or be relevant to,
clients' own views concerning their addiction. Providing an illustrative
example, a Case Manager (B4) expressed the view that discussing the
brain with clients often failed to align with clients’ own conceptions of
their addiction and could be disengaging (stymieing the therapeutic
process). She stated:
I don't think they [clients] would gravitate to that type of speak to
be perfectly honest. […] I've seen sometimes someone start speaking
about all your neuron transmitters [sic] and this and that happening
in your brain and they're all just like: “what the fuck?” […] they're
not really interested that there was a neuron transmitter that's gone
wrong in their brain. They're really pressured about “what is going
to become of me?”
Despite the enthusiasm of some participants for neurobiological
framings of addiction, others believed that discussions (and images) of
the brain were to be avoided in certain therapeutic settings. Thus, no-
tions and concepts from the neurosciences were used strategically and
selectively. This related to perceptions of clinical utility, which were
accounted for as resting upon provider opinion on whether neu-
roscientific concepts would align with, or be relevant to, clients’ own
views concerning their addiction. Hence, in some instances it would be
therapeutically unproductive or even disadvantageous to introduce
them.
5. Discussion
Our findings underscore how neuroscientific representations of ad-
diction were selectively deployed by treatment providers for presumed
therapeutic purposes. This process of (what we term) ‘selective neuro-
logisation’ of clients' actions and experiences was driven by two key,
and partially connected, factors: (1) whether a neurobiological account
was perceived by providers to resonate with clients' own imaginaries of
the ontology of addiction; and, (2) the extent to which providers
thought invoking neuroscience had clinical utility. Elaborating on the
second point, providers described a range of potential therapeutic
benefits of discussing addiction in terms of the brain. These included (a)
making sense of clients' feelings (e.g., depressed mood): and experi-
ences; (b) enjoining clients to concur with providers about the import of
certain actions in the future (e.g., refraining from drug consumption);
and, (c) fostering optimism about the future and reducing clients' self-
blame and guilt for past actions.
There were many instances where neuroscience was invoked for its
scientific authority in order to explain drug problems in terms of what
was “actually” happening for clients. The ‘epistemic authority’
(Boswell, 2008) that neuroscience commands in legitimating the ex-
istence of various phenomena and substantiating access to resources
has been the subject of critical analysis within other spheres, for in-
stance, the effects of neuroscience within social policy (Broer and
Pickersgill, 2015) and early childhood development policy (Edwards
et al., 2015). Challenging claims about the progressive effects of neu-
roscience, Edwards et al. (2015) found that ‘brain science claims’ es-
sentialised mother-child relations and biologised ideas concerning
childhood deprivation when invoked within childhood development
policy and practice. Our findings (perhaps more optimistically) indicate
that the decision about whether to deploy neuroscience for its epistemic
authority within addiction practice was conditional, based on a stra-
tegic choice guided by whether treatment providers perceived neu-
roscientific representations to be clinically advantageous. Thus, rather
than observing universal effects of neuroscientific discourses within
addiction practice, our findings provide insight into the role addiction
treatment providers play as agents in deciding whether to deploy neu-
roscience (including for its epistemic authority) for therapeutic benefit.
Further exploring the ways neuroscience was deployed, it is worth
reflecting on the flexibility and effects that neural imagining
(Buchbinder, 2015) affords in clinical practice. At one level, our find-
ings indicate that when addiction treatment providers assess it to be
clinically advantageous, they translate concepts emerging from neu-
roscience research such as brain damage linked to drug use, or ‘neu-
roplasticity’, highlighting the brain's ability to change. At another level,
this translation of individual concepts progresses into a completely
different style of communication: neural imagining (Buchbinder, 2015)
in the form of detailed neurobiological accounts using vivid metaphors
and stories. As Buchbinder (2015) notes, neural imagining serves to
represent the brain through language by enrolling materiality as a
rhetorical resource, whilst offering a ‘pliable’ form of expression that
operates to resist the “verisimilitude of diagnostic imaging techniques
in favour of creative forms of expression” (Buchbinder, 2015, p. 2).
Thus, for Buchbinder in the pain clinic, neural imagining afforded the
teenage brain to become a space of possibility, “not to map things as
they are, but rather, things as we hope they might be” (Buchbinder,
2015, p. 2). Buchbinder's theory about neural imagining may explain
why addiction treatment providers tended to avoid the use of images,
and instead to engage in verbal, highly metaphorical representations,
that afforded a more flexible and tailored approach when commu-
nicating about the brain and addiction with clients.
Treatment providers' avoidance of presenting neuroimages to clients
stands in contrast to what we might have expected from the range of
social scientific work emphasising the salience, function and effects of
brain images (e.g., Dumit, 1999; Dumit, 2004; Rose and Abi-Rached,
2013). Although critics have drawn attention to the often-incorrect
presentation of neuroimages as direct pictures of brain activity that aid
in the constitution of mental pathology (e.g., Dumit, 1999), our own
empirical work indicates that treatment providers did not perceive the
presentation of neuroimages as necessary or helpful. Given participants
generally did not report considering visual representations whilst
working with clients as of clinical benefit, the question is raised about
the possible effects and benefits of images or artistic impressions of the
brain presented in public health campaigns and client resources (e.g.,
websites about addiction). We see examples of neuroimages in many
contexts, for example, within a resource for Indigenous people in
Australia named the Grog Brain Story (Cairney et al., 2009), through to
the US where NIDA presents resources such as Drugs, Brains, and Be-
haviour: The Science of Addiction (National Institute of Drug Addiction,
2014). In the future, moving beyond our own sample, cross-cultural
research of treatment providers’ views about the effects of neuroimages
and how they present neuroscience in practice, along with the views of
clients themselves, presents an interesting opportunity for research,
particularly in light of the proliferation of addiction neuroscience and
neuroimages in the media and elsewhere.
At times, neuroscience was specifically framed as irrelevant by the
treatment providers we interviewed. This resonates with other work
(e.g., Fraser et al., 2018; Meurk et al., 2016; Pickersgill et al., 2011;
Pickersgill et al., 2015) which has shown how those often posited as
likely beneficiaries of neuroscientific concepts and findings can re-
flexively elide or problematise this knowledge. Somewhat less con-
sidered within the addiction literature have been analyses of treatment
providers themselves (though see, for examples: Barnett and Fry, 2015;
Bell et al., 2014; Fraser et al., 2018). Our contribution provides further
evidence that amongst treatment providers who are both biomedically
trained (e.g., addiction medicine, psychiatry) and those with other
educational backgrounds (e.g., social work), neurological ontologies
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can be at times positioned as lacking centrality and salience within
clinical work. It is worth noting, however, that these research examples
of treatment providers' views (e.g., Barnett and Fry, 2015; Bell et al.,
2014; Fraser et al., 2018) and our own work represent what appears to
have become an increasingly Australian branch of research exploring
addiction treatment providers' perspectives about neuroscience and the
clinical impact of the BDMA. Care should be taken in making as-
sumptions that similar findings hold true in other international con-
texts. Moreover, given that the BDMA receives particularly strong
support from policy-makers (e.g., NIDA) and treatment provider re-
presentative bodies such as the American Society of Addiction Medicine
(2011) in the US, a similar analysis of US treatment providers’ views
about neuroscience requires further attention.
Finally, what do our results mean for critical work on translation?
Given that providers did not view as mandatory, nor always attempt, to
enrol clients in a neuroscientific understanding of their addictive be-
haviour (i.e., for clients to consider their own drug use in terms of
neuroscience), a neuroscientific idiom was not an “obligatory rhetorical
passage point” (Broer and Pickersgill, 2015, p56; cf. Callon, 1984, p.
205) for provider-client interactions. Rather, treatment providers stra-
tegically and contingently decided upon whether to deploy neu-
roscientific representations within practice. These treatment practices
led to addiction being enacted in varying ways and with different effect.
Our work adds to existing STS scholarship (e.g., Farrugia and Fraser,
2017; Fraser, 2016; Savic et al., 2018; Seear, 2019) by demonstrating
the different ways addiction is problematised through clinical practice
and how its construction is highly context dependent.
Our work further renders problematic any straightforward as-
sumption about the universal and/or linear import of neuroscience to
practice, of the kind that is commonly implicit and sometimes explicit
within narratives of ‘bench-to-bedside’ translation. Importantly, given
that there are other examples of the translation of neuroscience to
practice (e.g., how treatment providers conceptualise the brain when
prescribing pharmacotherapies; or how they perceive client autonomy
in light of the damaged brain), the future holds many opportunities for
the application of social science studies of biomedicine to further in-
terrogate what it means to ‘translate’ neuroscience into clinical prac-
tice.
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